Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Preventing Accounting Fraud: A Study of Fraud Pentagon Model (full paper) by Achmad, Tarmizi
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Volume XIII 
Issue 2 (56) Spring 2018 
 
 
 
ISSN-L 1843 - 6110 
ISSN    2393 - 5162 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Editorial Board 
 
Editor in Chief 
PhD Professor Laura GAVRILĂ (formerly ŞTEFĂNESCU) 
Managing Editor 
PhD Associate Professor Mădălina CONSTANTINESCU 
Executive Editor 
PhD Professor Ion Viorel MATEI 
International Relations Responsible 
PhD Pompiliu CONSTANTINESCU 
 
Proof – readers 
PhD Ana-Maria TRANTESCU – English 
Redactors 
PhD Cristiana BOGDĂNOIU 
PhD Sorin DINCĂ 
PhD Loredana VĂCĂRESCU-HOBEANU 
 
 
 
European Research Center of Managerial Studies in Business Administration 
 
Email: jaes_secretary@yahoo.com 
Web: http://cesmaa.eu/journals/jaes/index.php 
Editorial Advisory Board 
 
 
Claudiu ALBULESCU, University of Poitiers, France, West University of Timişoara, Romania 
Aleksander ARISTOVNIK, Faculty of Administration, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia 
Muhammad AZAM, School of Economics, Finance & Banking, College of Business, Universiti Utara, Malaysia 
Cristina BARBU, Spiru Haret University, Romania 
Christoph BARMEYER, Universität Passau, Germany 
Amelia BĂDICĂ, University of Craiova, Romania 
Gheorghe BICĂ, Spiru Haret University, Romania 
Ana BOBÎRCĂ, Academy of Economic Science, Romania 
Anca Mădălina BOGDAN, Spiru Haret University, Romania 
Giacommo di FOGGIA, University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy 
Jean-Paul GAERTNER, l'Institut Européen d'Etudes Commerciales Supérieures, France 
Shankar GARGH, Editor in Chief of Advanced in Management, India 
Emil GHIŢĂ, Spiru Haret University, Romania 
Dragoş ILIE, Spiru Haret University, Romania 
Cornel IONESCU, Institute of National Economy, Romanian Academy 
Elena DOVAL, Spiru Haret University, Romania 
Camelia DRAGOMIR, Spiru Haret University, Romania 
Arvi KUURA, Pärnu College, University of Tartu, Estonia 
Rajmund MIRDALA, Faculty of Economics, Technical University of Košice, Slovakia 
Piotr MISZTAL, Technical University of Radom, Economic Department, Poland 
Simona MOISE, Spiru Haret University, Romania 
Mihail Cristian NEGULESCU, Spiru Haret University, Romania 
Marco NOVARESE, University of Piemonte Orientale, Italy 
Rajesh PILLANIA, Management Development Institute, India 
Russell PITTMAN, International Technical Assistance Economic Analysis Group Antitrust Division, USA 
Kreitz RACHEL PRICE, l'Institut Européen d'Etudes Commerciales Supérieures, France  
Mohammad TARIQ INTEZAR, College of Business Administration Prince Sattam bin Abdul Aziz University 
(PSAU), Saudi Arabia 
Andy ŞTEFĂNESCU, University of Craiova, Romania 
Laura UNGUREANU, Spiru Haret University, Romania 
Hans-Jürgen WEIßBACH, University of Applied Sciences - Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
 
Journal of Applied Economic Sciences is a young economics and interdisciplinary research 
journal, aimed to publish articles and papers that should contribute to the development of both the 
theory and practice in the field of Economic Sciences. 
The journal seeks to promote the best papers and researches in management, finance, 
accounting, marketing, informatics, decision/making theory, mathematical modelling, expert systems, 
decision system support, and knowledge representation. This topic may include the fields indicated 
above but are not limited to these. 
Journal of Applied Economic Sciences be appeals for experienced and junior researchers, who 
are interested in one or more of the diverse areas covered by the journal. It is currently published 
quarterly in 2 Issues in Spring (30th March), Summer (30th June), Fall (30th September) and Winter (30th 
December). 
Journal of Applied Economic Sciences is indexed in SCOPUS www.scopus.com, CEEOL 
www.ceeol.org, EBSCO www.ebsco.com, and RePEc www.repec.org databases. 
The journal will be available on-line and will be also being distributed to several universities, 
research institutes and libraries in Romania and abroad. To subscribe to this journal and receive the on-
line/printed version, please send a request directly to jaes_secretary@yahoo.com. 
  
 
 
Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
ISSN-L  1843 - 6110 
 ISSN   2393 – 5162 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Halil Dincer KAYA 
The Financial Crises of the 1990s and Environmental Sustainability: A Comparison of Developed  
versus Less Developed Countries                    ...293 
 
 
Tolulope F. OLADEJI, Ochei A. IKPEFAN, Philip O. ALEGE 
Stock Market Volatility and Non-Macroeconomic Factors: A Vector Error Correction Approach        …303 
 
 
Elena Vadimovna SEMENKOVA, Almaz Aidarbekovich EDILBAEV  
Behavioral Aspects in Calculating the Cost of Risk in the Russian Stock Market               …316 
 
 
 
Imane EL WAHLI, Radouane EL KHCHINE, Zine Elabidine GUENNOUN, Youness LAAROUSSI 
Hurst Parameter Estimation Methods: Comparative Study and Application           …326 
 
 
Samuel I. EGWUNATUM 
Interpolating Construction Projects Escalations from Egwunatum’s Time-Cost Equilibrial               …337 
 
 
Victoria Volodymyrivna ZHURYLO, Olga Yuriivna PRYGARA 
International Positioning Strategy of Ukrainian Advertising Service Companies on European  
Media Market                                ….357 
 
Silvia MEGYESIOVA, Anna ROZKOSOVA  
Success of Visegrad Group Countries in the Field of Labour Market                …369 
 
 
Muhammad Faraz RIAZ, Nataliia І. CHERKAS, João LEITÃO 
Corruption and Innovation: Mixed Evidences on Bidirectional Causality                …378 
 
 
Oleg Yurievich PATLASOV  
Economic Modernization of BRICS Countries the Background of the Formation of a New  
Geopolitical Reality                     ...385 
  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ravinder RENA, Auchalie J. MOTHUPI 
Case Study on the Patterns of Irregular Expenditure in Tswaing Local Municipality of North West 
Province in South Africa                     …394 
 
 
Marina Alekseevna IZMAYLOVA, Nasrulla Abdurahmanovich ADAMOV, Arseniy Valerievich 
BRYKIN, Vasiliy Vladimirovich SINIAEV, Lyudmila Bogdanovna LUCHITSKAYA 
Assessing the State of Logistics and Ways to Improve the Logistics Management in the  
Corporate Sector of the Russian Economy                   ...414 
 
 
Naseer KHAN, Abdel Moneim AHMED 
Investment Behaviour and Alternatives among Indian Expatriates in Dubai               …425 
 
 
Loredana VĂCĂRESCU HOBEANU 
The Elaboration, Adoption and Application of the Decisions in the Management Process              …433 
 
 
Violetta V. ROKOTYANSKAYA, Oksana V. MOSHCHENKO, Nikoli V. VALUISKOV,  
Gamlet Ya. OSTAEV, Natalia S. TARANOVA 
Control and Analytical Management Aspects of Debtor and Credit Deposit of Enterprises               …446 
 
 
 Viktoriya Valeryevna MANUYLENKO, Lubov Anatolevna KABARDAKOVA,  
Mariia Nikolaevna KONIAGINA, Viktor Nikolaevich GLAZ, Tatyana Andreyevna SADOVSKAYA 
Modification of Universal Toolset for Evaluation of Financial Sustainability of Corporations in  
their Strategic Planning                      …454 
 
 
Nazmul HOSSAIN, Raju Mohammad Kamrul ALAM, Galina GAVLOVSKAYA  
Effective Microcredit Banking for Growth and Development of Small Business and Improve the  
Poverty Condition in Bangladesh                    …465 
 
 
Martina ŽWAKOVÁ 
The Conditions for Digitalization and Industry 4.0 Development in Selected European States          …484 
 
 
Hien Ngoc NGUYEN, Lan Xuan PHAM 
The Relationship between Country-of-Origin Image, Corporate Reputation, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Trust and Customers’ Purchase Intention: Evidence from Vietnam               …498 
  
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
16 
17 
18 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
Silvia PARUSHEVA 
A Study on Adoption of Internet Banking and New Direct Banking Channels with Reference  
to Young Bulgarian Consumers                    ...510 
 
 
Keulana ERWIN, Erwin ABUBAKAR, Iskandar MUDA 
The Relationship of Lending, Funding, Capital, Human Resource, Asset Liability Management to 
Non-Financial Sustainability of Rural Banks (BPRs) in Indonesia                …520 
 
 
Aekkachai NITTAYAGASETWAT, Jiroj BURANASIRI 
Evaluation of the Investment in Combined Stock Markets under Co-Integration and Diversification 
Benefit: The Case of Southeast Asian Markets                  ...543 
 
 
Imang Dapit PAMUNGKAS, Imam GHOZALI, Tarmizi ACHMAD, Muammar KHADDAFI, 
Retnoningrum HIDAYAH 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Preventing Accounting Fraud: A Study of  
Fraud Pentagon Model                     …549 
 
 
Karim Bux Shah SYED, Fauzi Bin ZAINIR, Mansor ISA, Naveeda K. KATPER 
Integrating Reputational Considerations in the Empirical Analysis of Dividend Smoothing Policy of 
Emerging Market Firms - A Quantile Regression Approach                  …561 
 
 
Evans OSABUOHIEN, Ekene OBIEKWE, Ese URHIE, Romanus OSABOHIEN 
Inflation Rate, Exchange Rate Volatility and Exchange Rate Pass-Through Nexus: the Nigerian 
Experience                      …574 
 
 
Bona Doni GIDEON, Evita PUSPITASARI, Erlane K. GHANI, Ardi GUNARDI 
Earnings Quality: Does Principles Standards versus Rules Standards Matter?               …586 
 
 
  
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
 
  
Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
549 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Preventing Accounting Fraud: 
A Study of Fraud Pentagon Model 
 
Imang Dapit PAMUNGKAS 
Universitas Diponegoro, Indonesia 
Faculty of Economic and Business, Universitas Dian Nuswantoro, Indonesia 
imangfebudinus@gmail.com 
 
Imam GHOZALI 
Faculty of Economic and Business 
Universitas Diponegoro, Indonesia 
ghozali_imam@yahoo.com 
 
Tarmizi ACHMAD 
Faculty of Economic and Business 
Universitas Diponegoro, Indonesia 
 t_achmad@yahoo.com.au 
 
Muammar KHADDAFI 
Faculty of Economic and Business 
Universitas Malikussaleh, Indonesia 
khaddafi@unimal.ac.id 
 
Retnoningrum HIDAYAH 
Faculty of Economic and Business 
Universitas Negeri Semarang, Indonesia 
retnoningrum.hidayah@mail.unnes.ac.id 
Suggested Citation:  
Pamungkas, I. D. et al. 2018. Corporate Governance mechanisms in preventing accounting fraud: a study of fraud Pentagon 
Model. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, Volume XIII, Spring 2 (56):549 – 560. 
Abstract: 
This research is aimed to identify whether financial targets, ineffective monitoring, change in auditor, change in direction and 
arrogance on accounting fraud and analyse the moderating effect of corporate governance mechanism on fraud pentagon 
model. This research compile data of 12 companies of fraud and non-fraud 32 companies listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange during 2012-2016. The researcher uses logistic regression, the results of this study shows that risk factors in 
perspective fraud pentagon that significantly affect the accounting fraud are only a change in direction. As a moderating 
variable, corporate governance mechanisms ownership is only institutions which able to weaken the relationship of change 
in direction in the accounting fraud. 
Keywords: corporate governance mechanism; accounting fraud; fraud pentagon 
JEL Classification: G32; G34; M41  
Introduction  
The financial statements become one of the forms of corporate communication tools regarding financial data or 
operational activities of the company to the users of financial information. Users of financial information include: 
the management, employees, investors, creditors, suppliers, customers, and government. Companies can show 
their performance improvements over a period of time through financial reporting, but in fact there are many 
deviations such as number manipulation, disclosure, mark-up, and eliminating data in the presentation of financial 
statements. Performance results contained in the financial statements more aims to get the impression of "good" 
from various parties. Encouragement or motivation to always look good by various parties often force companies 
to manipulate in certain parts, so that ultimately presents information that is not appropriate and will harm many 
parties. Fraud by companies such as manipulating financial statements is often called accounting fraud. The 
behaviour of irregularities in the presentation of financial statements is an example of accounting fraud. 
According to the Indonesian Institute of Accountants (IAI 2011), the accounting fraud as: (1) 
Misstatements arising from fraud in financial reporting are misstatements or deliberate omission of amounts or 
disclosures in financial statements to trick users of financial statements, (2) misstatements arising from undue 
treatment of an asset (often referred to as misappropriation or embezzlement) relating to the theft of an entity's 
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assets resulting in a financial statement not presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles in Indonesia. Not stopping in ENRON's case, the recent accounting fraud case was also able to attack 
a technology company that has stood for 140 years, Toshiba Corporation. This case began to unfold since July 
2015, Toshiba proven to do the inflation of 151.8 billion ¥ profit or equivalent to 1.22 billion USD in five years. 
This is quite unfortunate by many parties, good corporate governance, reputable corporate reputation is not 
enough to make a company classmate Toshiba really clean of the fraud. The case of fraud experienced by 
Toshiba impact on the resignation of Toshiba CEO, Hisao Tanaka and followed by two other senior executives. 
In addition to the fraud diamond theory that continues from the fraud triangle theory, Crowe (2011) also 
helped refine the theory that triggered by Cressey. Crowe found a study that the element of arrogance also 
contributed to the occurrence of fraud. Crowe's research also includes fraud triangle theory and competence 
elements in it, so that the fraud model found by Crowe consists of five elements of indicators namely pressure, 
opportunity, rationalization, competence, and arrogance. The theory presented by Crowe in 2011 is named with 
Crowe's fraud pentagon theory. 
This study is a study that applies Crowe's fraud pentagon theory. This is done because the theory is a 
renewable theory that had not previously been applied to researching fraudulent financial reporting, especially in 
Indonesia, and the fraud indicator described in Crowe's fraud pentagon theory is much more complete than 
previous similar theories such as the theory of fraud triangle and fraud diamond. The elements in Crowe's fraud 
pentagon theory cannot simply be researched and thus require variable proxies. Proxies that can be used for this 
research include pressure proxied with, financial targets, financial stability, external pressure, and institutional 
ownership. These are the opportunity proxied by ineffective monitoring and the quality of external auditors; 
Rationalization proxied by change in auditor; Capability proxied by the change of company directors; and 
arrogance which is proxied with frequent number of CEO's picture. These five factors are indicated to be the 
trigger for the increase of fraud, especially in recent years. The desire of the company so that the operational 
activities of the company is guaranteed going concerned always look good cause companies sometimes take a 
shortcut (illegal) that is by doing fraud. 
This study was conducted because of the background of concern over the rise of cases of financial 
reporting fraudulent in Indonesia, especially in the financial sector and banking tend to be quite difficult to 
disclose. Until now, little research has been done to peel the case, especially by using Crowe's fraud pentagon 
theory. Based on this background, the study was conducted to conduct a more in-depth examination of Crowe's 
fraud pentagon theory proposed by Crowe (2011), to investigate and provide further explanation whether Crowe's 
fraud pentagon theory can help to detect a tendency for accounting fraud especially in the financial sector and 
banking and government sectors in Indonesia. 
Based on the results of previous studies indicate the inconsistency of research results related to the 
perspective of pentagon fraud. First, Financial targets were conducted by Lou and Wang (2009), Anshar (2012), 
Martantya (2013) and Firmanaya (2014) where the results of his research showed significant influence on 
accounting fraud. However, research results from Puspitrisnanty and Fitriyani (2014), Skousen et al. (2008); 
(2009) and Sukirman and Sari (2013) showed that ROA has no effect on accounting fraud. Second, ineffective 
monitoring is done by Skousen et al. (2008), Antonia (2008) and Sun and Liu (2013) have significant effect on 
accounting fraud. Nevertheless, Martantya's (2013), Skousen et al. (2009), and Ratmono et al. (2013) results 
show that ineffective monitoring has no effect on accounting fraud. Furthermore, the related rationalization factor 
is done by Chen and Elder (2007) and Sukirman and Sari (2013) whose research results show significant 
influence on accounting fraud. However, it is not in line with Firmanaya (2014) and Ratmono et al. (2013) where 
rationalization has no effect on accounting fraud. 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) clearly explain that the Change in Direction is capable of causing a stress 
period which opens up opportunities for fraud. Dechow et al. (1996) in relation to fraudulent financial reporting 
investigates the issue of corporate governance structures and the degree of concentration of ownership by 
insiders. The results showed that when the concentration of ownership owned by the fraud company will be easy 
to occur. Fraudulent financial reporting also relates to issues of corporate governance structure. Dechow et al. 
(1996) states clearly that the highest level of fraud occurs in companies with no good corporate governance or 
weak governance system. 
Arrogance is a behaviour of superiority and greed within someone who believes that internal control is not 
applied to him (Horwath 2011). Arrogance is usually more directed to a person who has a higher position in a 
company. A study by Tessa and Harto (2016) suggests that a CEO tends to be more willing to show everyone the 
status and position he has in the company because they do not want to lose that status or position. In research 
by Tessa and Harto (2016) it is also obtained the results of research on the influence of arrogance against the 
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detection of fraudulent financial statement. Where is argued that arrogance variables with proxy number of CEO 
photos contained in a financial report significantly affect the detection of fraudulent financial statement. 
In this study intends to examine and analyze the role of corporate governance mechanisms in preventing 
accounting fraud in the perspective of pentagon fraud by Crowe (2011). Corporate governance mechanisms can 
be used by companies to align ownership and management interests. Corporate governance mechanisms are 
needed in monitoring, controlling and managing where a means is used to weaken accounting fraud. Corporate 
governance mechanisms focused on the owners of these companies will certainly prevent accounting fraud. 
Thus, a strong corporate governance mechanism will weaken the risk factors for accounting fraud. Research on 
accounting fraud has been done but the results are still not established yet. There are different research results 
so that it becomes interesting and encourage the testing done in the next research. This study was motivated 
based on previous studies and the results of previous studies still have inconsistent results. 
Based on the phenomenon and research gap, where the inconsistency of research result motivates the 
researchers and it is interesting to do further research. This study considers the mechanism of corporate 
governance as a moderating variable to bridge the research gap. The research question is whether corporate 
governance mechanisms can prevent accounting fraud in the perspective of pentagon fraud. To analyse the fraud 
indicator in Crowe's fraud pentagon theory which consists of the effect of financial targets, ineffective monitoring, 
change in auditor, change in direction, arrogance on accounting fraud (2) To analyse the effect of corporate 
governance mechanism on financial targets, ineffective monitoring, change in auditors, change in direction and 
arrogance on accounting fraud.  
1. Research Background 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) explained that the occurrence of agency problems is the result of a 
contract between the principal and the agent. In practice, corporate managers who act as agents with 
responsibilities increase the profits of the owners, but managers also have an interest to maximize their welfare 
(Yantho and Pramuka 2007). The existence of different interests between principal and agent resulted in conflict 
of interest. With the conflict of interest is causing a variety of pressure for companies where the company must 
improve its performance in order to provide rationalization. The potential for fraud can easily occur when 
management has adequate capability, access and positioning (capability) and strong opportunity and opportunity) 
in fraudulent accounting. 
The company uses agency theory to pursue corporate governance mechanisms. The rise of corporate 
fraud cases in reporting their financial statements has attracted the attention of many academics and economists 
to develop various theories which is capable to be used as a reference to detect fraud. One of them is the theory 
of fraud risk factors that is fraud pentagon. Thus, this research is done by placing corporate governance 
mechanism as moderating variable to fill and answer research gap on the relation of risk factor to accounting 
fraud.  
Fraud Diamond 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) add three conditions put forward by Cressey (1953) in the form of factors that 
influence a person to cheat, with element capability. Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) argue that: "Many frauds, 
especially some of the multibillion-dollar ones, would not have occurred without the right person with the right 
capabilities in place. Opportunity opens the doorway to fraud, and incentive and rationalization can draw the 
person toward it. But the person must have the capability to recognize the open doorway as an opportunity and to 
take advantage of it by walking through, not just once, but time and time again. Accordingly, the critical question 
is who can turn on the opportunity for fraud into reality? ". 
According to Wolfe and Hermanson, fraud is unlikely to occur without a person having the proper ability to 
carry out such fraud. The capability in question is the nature of individuals committing fraud, which encourages 
them to seek opportunities and make use of them. Opportunities for entry to fraud, pressure and rationalization 
can attract a person to fraud, but the person must have a good ability to recognize the opportunity to do the fraud 
tactics appropriately and get the maximum profit. But none of this will happen without someone who has the 
ability to recognize opportunities as opportunities and take advantage of them. In 2004 came a fraud theory 
introduced by Wolfe and Hermanson, a theory they found known as fraud diamond theory. The theory of diamond 
fraud is a refinement of the theory of fraud triangle. The diamond fraud theory adds capability / capability 
elements as a fourth element in addition to pressure, opportunity, and rationalization elements previously 
described in the fraud triangle theory. 
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Crowe's Fraud Pentagon Theory 
Renewable theories that explore more deeply about the trigger factors of fraud are the pentagon fraud theory 
(Crowe's fraud pentagon theory). This theory was proposed by Crowe Howarth in 2011. The theory of pentagon 
fraud is an extension of the fraud triangle theory previously proposed by Cressey, in this theory adds two other 
elements of fraud: competence and arrogance competence. The competence described in the pentagon fraud 
theory has a similar meaning to the capability previously described in the fraud diamond theory by Wolfe and 
Hermanson in 2014. Competence is the ability of employees to ignore internal controls, develop concealment 
strategies, and controlling the social situation for his personal gain (Crowe 2011). According to Crowe, arrogance 
is an attitude of superiority over the rights owned and feels that internal control or company policy does not apply 
to him.  
Hypothesis Development 
Financial targets have a relationship with agency theory that explains the relationship between agents and 
principals. Agents and principals have an expectation to fulfill their respective interests. The connection in this 
case is in the desire of management to get a bonus on the results of their performance against the fulfillment of 
the principal desire is the fulfillment of financial targets in the form of profit. The higher the company's ability to 
achieve its financial goals can be said that the company's performance the better. But sometimes there are 
certain factor that cannot be controlled by the company to make the financial target is not achieved and the 
existence of the company will be in doubt. The emergence of pressures on achieving financial targets to earn 
bonuses on performance results and maintaining the existence of company performance can lead to the 
possibility of a pressure on the fulfillment of financial targets against fraudulent financial reporting. 
Managers in achieving the various targets of the company are required to work optimally. The manager 
tries to improve his performance in order to achieve the company's targets, one of which is the financial target. 
Skousen et al. (2008) says ROA is a ratio that measures operational performance which can reflect the level of 
asset efficiency used. This is supported by Cashmere (2013, 202) which says that ROA is a result or a return on 
the resources utilized. Therefore, ROA is used as a proxy for financial targets. Furthermore, ROA can be used by 
companies in measuring ability to generate profit. The higher the ROA, the higher the profits the company will 
earn and the better the company's condition if its assets are used (Dendawijaya 2005). Research done by Huang 
et al. (2016), Yesiariani and Rahayu (2016), Lin et al. (2015), Firmanaya and Syafruddin (2014) and Suyanto 
(2009) revealed that ROA as a proxy of financial targets has a significant effect on fraud. 
The higher the ROA the better the performance of management, which means the overall operation of the 
company, has been effective. However, in improving its performance by targeting higher ROA allows 
management to cheat in the form of accounting fraud. This is similar to the results of research Wisyastuti (2009) 
that when the company has a high profit level of fraud is also higher. So, the hypothesis in this study is: 
H1: Financial Targets Positive Influence on Accounting Fraud 
Ineffective monitoring is a condition in which the absence of effectiveness of internal control system owned 
by the company. This may occur because of management dominance by one person or small group, without 
compensation control, ineffective oversight of the board of directors and audit committee on internal financial 
reporting and control processes and the like (SAS No.99). With the lack of control from the internal company 
becomes an opportunity for some parties to manipulate the data in the financial statements. 
Accounting fraud is one result of poor monitoring levels and inadequate monitoring systems. In these 
conditions trigger the occurrence of fraud because the opportunity to do things that harm and violate the rules of 
the company is very wide open (Andayani 2010). Companies if their level of supervision is low will have many 
gaps of all forms of crime including accounting fraud. SOP enforcement and proper monitoring of the system 
becomes a must if you want to avoid cheating. With the existence of a good oversight mechanism is expected to 
minimize the fraud. In addition, the audit committee should monitor periodically and intensively to management. If 
the audit committee function does not work, then it triggers an opportunity or opportunity where it will easily be 
used by some parties to make a profit by doing accounting fraud. The hypothesis in this study is: 
H2: Ineffective Monitoring Positive Influence on Accounting Fraud 
Rationalization is one of the risk factors of fraud triangle that leads to fraud. Substitution of auditors and 
KAP becomes the proxy of rationalization (Skousen et al. 2009). The change in auditor or the change of auditor 
used by the company may be considered as a form to eliminate the fraud trail discovered by the previous auditor. 
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This tendency encourages companies to replace their independent auditors to cover the fraud within the 
company. According to Stice (1991) that the change of auditors occurred due to several things including the risk 
of audit failure and subsequent litigation becomes greater than the following year. Change in auditor can indicate 
the occurrence of a fraud. The results of Loebbecke et al. (1989) found a fraud occurring during auditor tenure 
which is still in its first two years of service. This is similar to Albrecht (2002), which states that auditor turnover is 
related to accounting fraud. Substitution of auditors results in the stress period and transition period of a 
company. One indication of accounting fraud is the change of auditors in two years’ period. The higher the auditor 
turnover, the higher the accounting fraud rate will occur. So the hypothesis in this study is: 
H3: Change in Auditor Positive Influence on Accounting Fraud 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) argue that a fraud is not possible if it is not done by someone with the right 
ability and position to carry out every detail of the cheating. Capability means the efforts of a person in committing 
acts of cheating for the achievement of certain goals. Sihombing and Rahardjo (2014) use change in direction as 
a proxy of capability to identify indications of accounting fraud. Change in Direction makes the initial performance 
is not optimal which caused the company during the transition period requires time to adjust (Sihombing and 
Rahardjo 2014). Change in Direction leads to conflict of interest because it is generally politically charged and 
there are interests of certain parties. Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) state clearly that the capability of the Change 
in Direction is motivated and triggers a fraud. Change in Direction can be considered as a strategy to remove the 
traces of previous directors which are considered to understand the various frauds that has been done by the 
company. 
With a change or change of directors this can appear stress period that will provide opportunities for a 
cheating in the company. This will affect the company's performance results are not maximal. Do not stop there, 
internal parties are also required to quickly adapt to the new director for corporate performance recovery. In a 
study conducted by Indah (2017) confirmed that the change of directors can affect the accounting fraud. This is 
supported by research conducted by Rika Widya (2014). 
A change of board of directors is chosen as a variable of one of the elements in Crowe's fraud pentagon 
theory, capability. There are six components in capability, including: positioning, intelligence, confidence / ego, 
coercion skills, effective lying/ deceit, and stress management. The change of board of directors is the transfer of 
authority from the old directors to the new directors with the aim of improving the previous management 
performance. Substitution of directors indicated able to describe ability in doing stress management. Wolfe and 
Hermanson (2004) argue that changes in directors are capable of causing a stress period that affects the more 
open opportunities for fraud. 
The change of the board of directors can be a company's effort to improve the performance of the 
previous directors by changing the composition of directors or recruitment of new directors who are considered 
more competent than previous directors (Tessa and Harto 2016). On the other hand, a change of board of 
directors may be a company's attempt to get rid of directors who are deemed to know the fraud committed by the 
company and the change of board of directors is considered to require adaptation time so that initial performance 
is not maximal (Tessa and Harto 2016). Hypothesis in this research are: 
H4: Change in Direction has a positive effect on Accounting Fraud 
Arrogance is a behaviour of superiority and greed that exists in someone who believes that internal control 
is not applied to him (Horwath 2011). Arrogance is usually more directed to a person who has a high position in a 
company. A study by Tessa and Harto (2016) suggests that a CEO tends to be more willing to show everyone the 
status and position he has in the company because they do not want to lose that status or position. In research 
Tessa and Harto (2016) also obtained the results of research on the influence of arrogance against the detection 
of fraudulent financial statement. Where is argued that arrogance variables with proxy number of CEO photos 
contained in a financial report significantly affect the detection of fraudulent financial statement. 
Arrogance can be measured by the frequent number of CEO's picture which is the number of CEO photos 
emblazoned on the company's annual report. The large number of CEO photographs emblazoned in an annual 
company report can represent the level of arrogance or superiority that the CEO has. A CEO tends to be more 
willing to show everyone the status and position he has in the company because they do not want to lose that 
status or position (or feel unacknowledged), this is in line with one of the elements expressed by Crowe (2011). A 
high level of arrogance can lead to fraud because with the arrogance and superiority of a CEO, the CEO feels 
that any internal control will not apply to him because of his status and position. According to Crowe (2011), there 
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is also the possibility that the CEO will do whatever it takes to maintain the position and position it currently holds. 
On the basis of such thinking it can be constructed a hypothesis: 
H5: Arrogance has a positive effect on Accounting Fraud 
The Board of Commissioners has full authority and responsibility in controlling, supervising and directing 
the management of the company's resources (Sykhoroza 2005). When the company has a board of 
commissioners that works effectively then its performance will also be good. The quality of this function is a 
determinant of the effectiveness of corporate governance. Differences of interests between the owners of the 
company and management can be aligned with corporate governance mechanisms. The quality of corporate 
governance mechanism is widely related to the quality of the company (Tangjitprom 2013). Monitoring by the 
board of commissioners and shareholders is a very important mechanism in aligning shareholder and 
management interests. The effectiveness of company monitoring conducted by an independent board of 
commissioners will minimize fraud despite high financial targets, ineffective monitoring, change in auditors, 
change in direction, and high arrogance. The Board of Commissioners has the responsibility to oversee 
management and ensure the implementation of the management of the company, the enforcement of SOP and 
the obligation of corporate accountability in accordance with the results of the corporate governance forum in 
2003. 
The results of the study (Skousen et al. 2009) prove that fraud occurs in companies with few external 
board members. Further research Beasley (1996) states the entry of the board of external commissioners 
improve the effectiveness of management control in order to prevent the occurrence of accounting fraud. The 
same thing was also expressed by Dechow et al. (1996) and Dunn (2004) in which many commissioner 
commissions are able to prevent fraud. Based on (KNKG 2004) the board of commissioners is responsible and 
competent in management monitoring. Board of commissioners is a predictable corporate governance 
mechanism affecting managerial opportunistic behaviour. So, the hypotheses of this study are: 
H6a: Board of Commissioners as moderator Negative on Financial Target relationship to Accounting Fraud. 
H6b: Board of Commissioners as moderator Negative on Ineffective Monitoring relationship against Accounting 
Fraud. 
H6c: Board of Commissioners as moderator Negative on the Change in Auditor relationship to Accounting 
Fraud. 
H6d: Board of Commissioners as moderator Negative on the Change in Direction relationship to Accounting 
Fraud. 
H6e: Board of Commissioners as moderator Negative on the relationship of Arrogance to Accounting Fraud. 
Corporate governance is a controlling company in order to organize and manage in which the objective is 
to increase the accountability and prosperity of the company Monks and Minow (2011). Control is to oversee the 
manager, so that managers can work in accordance with its function. The effectiveness of the board of 
commissioners will add strength to the CEO, where CEO strength is influenced by the level of independence of 
the board of commissioners. Independent Commissioner is a member of the board of commissioners which is not 
affiliated with the controlling shareholder, among members of the board of commissioners, management and 
other parties capable of affecting the level of independence and only works for the benefit of the company's 
welfare (KNKG 2004). 
Independent commissioner is a strategic position in carrying out supervisory functions in order to 
implement good corporate governance. The results of Chtourou et al. (2001) provide conclusions when there is 
an independent board of commissioners that can influence accounting fraud caused in the supervision work 
independently. When an independent board of commissioners increases its oversight, then the accounting fraud 
rate will be lower. This is similarly delivered by Matolcsy et al. (1997) board dominated by internal directors tend 
to have weak corporate governance. Thus, accounting fraud can be minimized by discharging an independent 
commissioner because an independent commissioner is an independent party that represents a shareholder 
whose job is to specifically oversee all actions of the manager. Accounting cheating will be reduced because they 
are overseen by independent commissioners despite the financial targets, ineffective monitoring, change in 
auditors, change in direction, and high arrogance. Hypotheses in this research are: 
H7a: Independent Commissioner as moderator Negative on Financial Target relationship to Accounting 
Fraud. 
Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
555 
H7b: Independent Commissioner as moderator Negative on Ineffective Monitoring relationship to 
Accounting Fraud. 
H7c: Independent Commissioner as moderator Negative on the Change in Auditor relationship to 
Accounting Fraud. 
H7d: Independent Commissioner as moderator Negative on the Change in Direction relationship to 
Accounting Fraud. 
H7e: Independent Commissioner as moderator Negative on relationship Arrogance to Accounting Fraud. 
Institutional modelling becomes the proxy for corporate governance mechanism that is predicted to 
weaken the correlation of fraud diamond risk factors to accounting fraud. Beiner (2004) explains that to know the 
ownership of instirusi based on the percentage of voting rights owned by the institution. Institutional ownership 
has the ability to control management through effective monitoring so as to minimize fraud. This is because 
institutional investors are sophisticated investors that they are not easily fooled by the management of the 
company. Institutional investors in investment analysis activities spend a lot of time and institutions have spent a 
lot of money in gaining access to information so that they work in the process of control becomes optimal. 
Cornertt et al. (2006) states that supervision conducted by institutional investors in a company could limit 
the behaviour of managers. Furthermore, Cornett et al. (2006) supervision by institutional investors is also able to 
encourage managers to give priority to company performance that can minimize opportunistic management 
behaviour. The existence of institutional ownership will reduce accounting fraud so that the financial statements 
can describe the real concept although the level of financial targets, ineffective monitoring, change in auditors, 
change in direction, high arrogance. Hypotheses in this research are: 
H8a: Institutional Owners as moderator Negative on Financial Target relationship to Accounting Fraud.  
H8b: Institutional Owners as moderator Negative on Ineffective Monitoring relationship against Accounting 
Fraud. 
H8c: Institutional as Owners Moderator Negative on Change in Auditor relationship to Accounting Fraud.  
H8d: Institutional Owners as moderator Negative on Change in Direction relationship to Accounting Fraud.  
H8e: Institutional Owners as moderator Negative on the relationship of Arrogance to Accounting Fraud.  
Theoretical framework for testing the effect of financial target, ineffective monitoring, change in auditor, 
change in direction, arrogance on accounting fraud and corporate governance mechanism as a moderating can 
be conveyed as shown below: 
Figure 1. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Secondary data are processed (2018) 
2. Methodology 
This research is a type of correlational research using quantitative approach because it leads to generalization, 
explaining the various phenomena and testing of the theory with variables in the form of numbers, data analysis 
and various evidences using statistical procedures. The population of this study is non-financial companies listing 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Further selection of samples based on purposive sampling method where 
criteria as follows: 1). Non-financial companies listing on IDX in 2012-2016, 2). Companies subject to Bapepam-
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LK sanctions in violation of Bapepam-LK regulation number VIII.G7 related to fraudulent financial statement 
presentation. 3). Companies that have complete data in 2012-2016. 
The next step of the sample is obtained in pairs of companies that do accounting fraud and companies 
that do not commit accounting cheating in accordance with research Owen (2009). This study uses a sample of 
public companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) using the media of financial statements 
beginning from December 31, 2012 until December 31, 2016 (audited). The data analysis is using binary logistic 
method in analysing financial risk factors in identifying accounting fraud. 
Operational Definition of Variables 
All components of risk factors based on diamond Fraud cannot be observed directly. Furthermore, pressure is 
proxied with financial targets (ROA), opportunities proxied by ineffective monitoring (BDOUT), rationalization 
proxied by change in auditor (ΔCCPA), capabilities produced by Change in Direction (DCHANGE) and arrogance 
proxied with frequent number of CEO's picture in an annual report, as well as corporate governance mechanism 
proxied boards of commissioners, independent board of commissioners and institutional ownership. 
Table 1. Operationalization Variable 
Variable Dimension Indicator Scale Dimension 
Accounting Fraud (Y) 
(Dependent Variable) 
Annual Report 
and case reports 
of violation of 
article VIII.G.7 of 
OJK of non-
financial listed 
companies 2012-
2016 listed on 
BEI 
Dummy Variables, companies that 
violate article VIII.G.7 on the guidelines 
for presentation and disclosure of 
financial statements with number 1. 
Furthermore, companies in violation of 
Article VIII.G.7 regarding the 
presentation and disclosure of financial 
statements shall be numbered 0 (zero). 
Nominal 
Scale 
Skousen et 
al. (2009) 
Financial Target 
(Independent Variable) 
Financial 
Information 
Returns On Asset = Profit after Tax t-1 
                                   Total Asset-1 
Ratio 
Scale 
Skousen et 
al. (2009) 
Ineffective Monitoring 
(Independent Variable) 
Financial 
Information 
BDOUT= 
Number of Independent Commissioners 
 Number of Board of Commissioners 
Ratio 
Scale 
Skousen et 
al. (2009) 
Rationalization 
(Independent Variables) 
Financial 
Information 
Change in Auditor (ΔCPA) Dummy 
variable, if a change of KAP within 3 
years with number (one), if within 3 
years do not experience change of KAP 
then given the number 0 (zero) 
Nominal 
Scale 
Skousen et 
al. (2009) 
Capability 
(Independent Variable) 
Financial 
Information 
Change in Direction per(DCHANGE) 
Measured by Dummy variable, if 
experiencing Change in Direction within 
the period 2012-2016 with the number I 
(one), and if the company period 2012-
2016 no change in direction then given 
the number 0 (zero). 
Nominal 
Scale 
Skousen et 
al. (2009) 
Arrogance (Independent 
Variables) 
Financial 
Information 
Frequent number of CEO's Picture in an 
annual report 
Nominal 
Scale 
Crowe 
(2011) 
Corporate Governance 
Mechanism (Board of 
Commissioners) 
(Moderating Variables) 
Financial 
Information 
The size of the board of commissioners 
is the proportion of the entire board of 
commissioners 
Nominal 
Scale 
Lipton dan 
Lorsch 
(1992) 
Corporate Governance 
Mechanism (Commissioner 
Indpenden) (Moderating 
Variables) 
Financial 
Information 
Independent Commissioner is the 
number of members of the board of 
commissioners where from external or 
outside the company 
Nominal 
Scale Klein (2002) 
Corporate Governance 
Mechanism (Institutional 
Ownership) (Moderating 
Variables) 
Financial 
Information 
Total ownership, by institutional 
investors 
Nominal 
Scale 
Jiang dan 
Andarajan 
(2009) 
Source: Secondary data are processed (2018) 
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3. Case studies/experiments/demonstrations/application functionality  
This research tested hypothesis with binary logistic regression to analyse influence of financial target, ineffective 
monitoring, change in auditor, change in direction and frequent number of CEO's Picture moderated by corporate 
governance mechanism to accounting fraud. According to Ghozali (2006) research with logistic regression 
ignores normality testing for independent variables. Since of this research used logistic regression where 
independent variables are combined non-metric and continue or metric categorical so that it will also ignores the 
problem of heteroscedasticity. Regression model 1 is on factors affecting accounting fraud. Furthermore, for 
model 2 with regression analysis technique based on interaction due to quasi moderating. Logistic regression 
model in hypothesis testing on model 1 is Ln (F / 1-F) = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3 x3 + β4x4 + e and testing model 2 
hypothesis is Ln (F / 1-F) = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3 x3 + β4x4 + β5x5 + e. Where, Ln (F / 1-F) = The dummy 
variable, the firm commits the accounting fraud by the number 1 and who does not commit accounting fraud by 0, 
X1 = Financial Targets, X2 = Ineffective Monitoring, X3 = Change in Auditor, X4 = Change X6 = Board of 
Commissioners, X7 = Independent Commissioner, X8 = Ownership of institutions, β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5 
(regression coefficients) and e = errors. 
Based on the SPSS output then the test is done with various stages that must be passed such as: first, 
Assessing Hosmer and lemenshow goodness of fit test or feasibility on the regression model. Second, coefficient 
is terminated and third, Assess Overall Model (Overall Model Fit). Furthermore, descriptive statistical analysis 
which includes the number of samples, mean, maximum and minimum and standard deviation. 
Sample and Research Data 
The following is the result of sample selection based on purposive sampling which resulted in 12 fraud companies 
and non-fraud companies of 32 for the period of 2012-2016. The details of the fraud and non-fraud sample 
selection procedures as shown in Table 2 and Table 3 are as follows: 
Table 2. Sample Selection Procedure for Fraud Company 
Sample Criteria Companies that meet the criteria 
The population of non-financial companies where the listing on the BEI in 2012-2016 411 
Company violating article no. VIII.G.7 subject to sanctions from OJK in 2012-2016 39 
The company has complete data in 2012-2016. 12 
Number of Samples 12 
Source: Secondary data are processed (2018) 
Table 3. Sample Selection Procedure for Non-Fraud Company 
Sample Criteria Companies that meet the criteria 
The population of non-financial companies where the listing on the BEI in 2012-2016 411 
Has a period of time and sectors such as with fraud companies in violation of article 
no. VIII.G.7 subject to sanctions from OJK in 2012-2016 88 
The company has complete data in 2012-2016. 32 
Number of Samples 32 
Source: Secondary data are processed (2018) 
Descriptive Testing 
The following is the result of statistical descriptive analysis data processing which helps to obtain a general 
picture related to independent variables, moderating variables and dependent variables. Descriptive statistical 
analysis is used to show the spread of research data. This analysis presents research data by looking at the 
mean (mean), standard deviation, maximum value and minimum value of research data. In this study using SPSS 
22.0 program shown in Table 4 as follows: 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics Results 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
Financial Targets 44 -.12 .44 .0921 .12124 
Innefective Monitoring 44 .14 .50 .03510 .09081 
Change in Auditor 44 .00 1.00 .6410 .48597 
Change in Direction 44 .00 1.00 .4103 .49831 
Arrogance 44 .00 28.00 7.5385 6.77397 
Board of Commissioners 44 2.00 8.00 4.0513 1.45002 
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Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
Independent Commissioner 44 1.00 3.00 1.3846 .54364 
Institutional Ownership 44 .25 .91 .5685 .14730 
Accounting Fraud 44 .00 1.00 .3573 .46757 
Source: Secondary data are processed (2018) 
Based on the results of descriptive statistics test shows the number of samples of 44. The minimum value 
of the financial target has a value of -0.12 which indicates that the financial target (ROA) is considered very low. 
The maximum value is highest in the board of commissioner variables when compared to independent 
commissioners and other institutional or variable ownership. Furthermore, for the standard deviation is low, so the 
lower the standard deviation means the more homogeneous variables where the variation is less meaning that 
the data is good enough. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Testing the logistic regression hypothesis can be done by looking at the table of logistic coefficient test results in 
the significant column compared with the significance value used a = 5%. If the level of significance is <0.05, then 
H1 cannot be rejected or accepted. If the level of significance is > 0.05, then H1 is rejected. The result of 
hypothesis testing with binary logistic regression is shown in Table 5 as follows: 
Table 5. Hypothesis Test Results 
Variable Significance Description 
  X1                   Y 0.113 Hypothesis 1 Rejected 
  X2                   Y 0.226 Hypothesis 2 Rejected 
  X3                   Y 0.121 Hypothesis 3 Rejected 
  X4                   Y 0.011* Hypothesis 4 Accepted 
  X5                   Y 0.243 Hypothesis 5 Rejected 
  X1*Z1                     Y 0.567 Hypothesis 6a Rejected 
  X2*Z1                     Y 0.175 Hypothesis 6b Rejected 
  X3*Z1                     Y 0.831 Hypothesis 6c Rejected 
  X4*Z1                     Y 0.028* Hypothesis 6d Accepted 
  X5*Z1                     Y 0.644 Hypothesis 6e Rejected 
  X1*Z2                     Y 0.253 Hypothesis 7a Rejected 
  X2*Z2                     Y 0.427 Hypothesis 7b Rejected 
  X3*Z2                     Y 0.550 Hypothesis 7c Rejected 
  X4*Z2                     Y 0.023* Hypothesis 7d Accepted 
  X5*Z2                     Y 0.454 Hypothesis 7e Rejected 
  X1*Z3                     Y 0.645 Hypothesis 8a Rejected 
  X2*Z3                     Y 0.816 Hypothesis 8b Rejected 
  X3*Z3                     Y 0.240 Hypothesis 8c Rejected 
  X4*Z3                     Y 0.015* Hypothesis 8d Accepted 
  X5*Z3                     Y 0.320 Hypothesis 8e Rejected 
Note: *) Significant Value: 0.05 (5%) 
Source: Secondary data are processed (2018) 
The result of hypothesis test one (H1) proves that the financial targets variable (ROA) have positive but 
not significant effect to the possibility of fraudulent financial reporting with significance level of 0.113 and B 6,767. 
The results of this study support research conducted by Sihombing (2014) and Diany (2014). In the study stated 
that there is no influence between financial targets against the possibility of fraudulent financial reporting. The 
results of this study also support research conducted by Skousen et al. (2009) that the financial targets proxied 
with return on assets (ROA) have no effect on the possibility of accounting fraud. 
The result of hypothesis two (H2) test shows that the ineffective monitoring (BDOUT) has an insignificant 
effect on the number 0.226 and has a negative direction on the number B = -1,835. This is in line with the 
research that has been done by Skousen et al. (2009), Norbarani (2012), Martantya (2013), and Sihombing 
(2014) which also stated that ineffective monitoring (BDOUT) has no significant influence in detecting accounting 
fraud. The result of hypothesis three (H3) showed that the variable of change in auditor (CPA) had negative and 
insignificant effect in detecting fraudulent financial reporting with significance level of 0.121 and B -0.389. This 
result is consistent with research conducted by Skousen et al. (2009), Diany (2014), and Sihombing (2014) who 
also stated that the change in auditor has no effect on accounting fraud. 
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The results of hypothesis four (H4) showed that the variable of company directors replacement 
(DCHANGE) had a negative and significant effect in detecting accounting fraud with significance level of 0.011 
and B -0.007. Replacement of directors may be the company's attempt to get rid of directors who are deemed to 
know the fraud of the company and the change of board of directors is considered to require adaptation time so 
that initial performance is not maximal (Tessa and Harto 2016, 10). Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) argue that 
changes in directors are capable of causing a stress period that affects the more open opportunities for fraud. 
The result of hypothesis five (H5) shows that the frequent number of CEO's picture (CEOPIC) variable has 
a positive and significant effect on accounting fraud with significance level of 0243 and B0, 040. The test results 
prove that the more the number of CEO photos emblazoned in a report can indicate the high level of arrogance 
CEO in the company. A high level of arrogance can lead to fraud because with the arrogance and superiority of a 
CEO, the CEO feels that any internal control will not apply to him because of his status and position. According to 
Crowe (2011), there is also the possibility that the CEO will do whatever it takes to maintain the position and 
position it currently holds. 
Based on Table 5 shows that H1 test results obtained significance value of 0.113 (>0.05) thus H1 is 
rejected. This is in line with the results of research Puspitrisnanty and Fitriyani (2014), Skousen et al. (2008); 
(2009) and Sukirman and Sari (2013) show ROA has no effect on accounting fraud. H2 test results obtained 
significance value of 0.226 (>0.05) thus H2 rejected. The results of this study are similar to the results of research 
Martantya (2013), Skousen et al. (2009), and Ratmono et al. (2013) showed that ineffective monitoring has no 
effect on accounting fraud. Furthermore, for testing H3 obtained significance value of 0.121 (>0.05) thus H3 
rejected. This is in line with the results of research Firmanaya (2014) and Ratmono et al. (2013) where 
rationalization has no effect on accounting fraud. For H4 test, the significance value of 0.011 (<0.05) thus H4 is 
accepted change in direction is capable of giving birth to stress period, adaptation and adjustment which opens 
the opportunity for cheating. For testing of H5 we get the significance value of 0.243 (<0.05) thus H5 is rejected 
Testing H6a with significance value of 0.567 (>0.05), H6b with significance value of 0.175 (>0.05), H6c 
with significance value of 0.831 (> 0.05), H6d with significance value 0.028 (<0.05) and H6e with significance 
value 0.644 (<0.05). Thus H6a, H6b, H6c, H6e are rejected but H6d is accepted. The board of commissioners is 
able to moderate in this case weaken the change in direction relationship to accounting fraud because corporate 
governance mechanisms can be used by companies to align ownership and management interests. 
H7a test result with significance value of 0.253 (>0.05), H7b with significance value of 0.427 (>0.05), H7c 
with significance value 0.550 (>0.05), H7d with significance value 0.023 (<0.05), H7e with significance value 
0.454 (<0.05), then H7a, H7b, H7c, and H7e the hypothesis is rejected while H6d is accepted. Independent 
commissioners are able to moderate in this case to weaken the change in derision to accounting fraud because 
independent commissioners from outside the company are more focused and not easily influenced by anyone in 
monitoring, controlling and managing where a way is used to weaken the occurrence of accounting fraud. 
Furthermore, the H8a test results with significance value of 0.645 (>0.05). H8b with significance value of 
0.816 (>0.05), H8c with significance value 0.240, H8d with significance value 0.015 (<0.05), H8e with significance 
value 0.320 (<0.05). The test results show that H8a, H8b, H8c, H8e are rejected, but for H8d is acceptable. The 
ownership of the institution is able to moderate the change in direction to accounting fraud because the corporate 
governance mechanism focused on the owners of this company will certainly prevent accounting fraud. 
Conclusion 
Based on testing H1, H6a, H7a, and H8a rejected, test results H2, H6b, H7b, and H8c rejected. For test results 
H3, H6c, H7c, and H8c rejected. Further research results H4, H6d, H7d and H8d accepted test results H5, H6e, 
H7e, and H8e rejected. Limitations in this study that the number of samples is relatively small, due only to 
companies listed on the stock exchange alone. 
Based on the result of analysis, conclusion, and limitations of this research, it is necessary to develop and 
improve for subsequent research to be better and there are some suggestions given for future research, among 
others: (1) Further research is suggested to expand the sector ie in sector government and in various countries. 
This is recommended because in the government sector there are also many cases of fraud but in the case of 
misuse of assets (2) Until now still rarely research that investigate cases of fraud in the financial and banking 
sector, whereas based on data from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiner (2014) fraud case most 
commonly in the financial and banking sectors. The next researcher is expected to develop research on the 
financial and banking sector or develop into the second most sectors that conduct fraud cases i.e. public sector 
government funds. (3) Related research fraudulent financial reporting, researcher hereinafter advised to use 
qualitative method in research methodology or use combination (Mixied Method) that is qualitative and 
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quantitative method. This is suggested because there are still many fraud elements that are difficult to measure 
when using only quantitative methods, such as rationalization and capability elements. 
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